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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IRENE PAUL and CHARLES J.
PAUL,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
-vs.WOODRO\V LAWRENGE KIRKENDALL, JOHN DOE, JANE DOE
AND JOHN DOE COMPANY,
Defendants,
and
MARYLAND CASUALTY COMpANY, a corporation,
Garnishee and Appellant.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents (who will be referred to in this brief
as the plaintiffs) agree with the statement of facts set
forth in Appellant's brief.
However, it is necessary to add thereto one additional fact: the chose in action subjected to garnishment
herein is a liquidated claim. At the pre-trial conference
held in the garnishment proceeding it was admitted by
Appellant Garnishee that its liability to the defendant
judgment debtor herein, if any there is, is the difference
between the amount of the Plaintiffs' judgment and the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

amount heretofore paid thereon by the Ga1nishee under
its policy of insurance. The perfonnance of this mathematical subtraction discloses that the claim or credit
is liquidated in the sum of $10,605.39, with interest at
So/o from November 20, 1953, for which sum the clerk
below issued execution at the .smne time the garnishment
was issued.
The sole .and narrow issue presented by this interlocutory appeal is whether or not the liability of the
Garnishee alleged in Plaintiffs' reply to the Garnishee's
answers herein 1nay be reached by garnishment under
Rule 64D, Utah Rule.s of Civil Procedure.
Throughout this brief a reference to the "Rules" is
a reference to the "Utah Rules of Civil Procedure."
STATE~IEN~'

OF POINTS

POINT I. THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 64D RELATING TO GARNISHMENT MUST BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED.
POINT 2. GARNISHEE'S LIABILITY TO THE DEFENDANT HEREIN IS A DEBT, CREDIT, CHOSE IN
ACTION, OR OTHER PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THE DEFEDANT HEREIN WITHIN THE MEANING OF RULE 64D.
POINT 3. GARNISHEE'S LIABILITY TO DEFENDANT
HEREIN IS IN GARNISHEE'S POSSESSION OR CONTROL
WITHIN THE MEANING OF RULE 64D.
POINT 4. THE AUTHORITIES RELIED ON BY APPELLANT ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE ARISING UNDER THE PECULIAR UTAH RULES.

ARGlTl\fENT
POINT I.

THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 64D RELAT-
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ING TO GARNISHMENT MUST BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED.

According to the general rule applicable, to statutes
jn derogation of the common law, garnishment statutes
are usually construed strictly against the party resorting
to the remedy, and, as a corollary to this rule, a liberal
construction is indulged in favor of the garnishee.
38 C.J.S. Garnishment, Sec. 3, Page 209.
The contrary is the rule ·in Utah, and our Rules on
attachment and garnishment must be liberally construed
to fully effectuate their purpose and objects, to promote
justice, and to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of the garnishrnent action or proceeding.

r··
~. :

r"

t ..

r

!')':

!j, ..

·'1

\
··'

'rhis Court, in Rule 1(a), has enjoined that all of
the Rules "shall be liberally construed to secure the just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.''
The Utah Rules on attachment and garnishment are
taken from Chapters 18 and 19, respectively, of Title 104,
U.C.A., 1943, and both the legislature and this court have
declared that they should receive a liberal construction
as stated.
The legislature has specifically provided that,
"The rule of the common law that Statutes
in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed
has no application to the statutes of this state.
The statutes establish the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate, and
theiT prorvisions and all proceedings under them
are to be liberally construed with a view to effect

3
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the objects of the statutes and to promote justice."
(Italic_s supplied.)
Section 88-2-2, U.C.A. 1943;
Section 68-3-2, U.C.A. 1953.

And this court has itself declared :
"The provisions of our statute relating to
garnishments are very broad and comprehensive.
This court has held (Cole v. Utah Sugar Co., 35
Utah 148, 99 Pac. 681) that the statute should be
liberally construed, and so as to fully effectuate
the purpose sought to be attained thereby."
"\Vest Cache Sugar Co. v. Hendrickson, 56
Utah 327, 190 Pac. 946, 11 ALR 216.
In that case this court approved a court order requiring a garnishee bank to drill open a safe deposit box
rented to defendant in order to turn over to the sheriff
the property of the defendant which might be found
therein. This is certainly a very liberal interpretation.
·rhese rules of construction, of course, are deemed
to have been adopted as a part of the Rules of Procedure
along with the statutes to which they apply.
\Vith these liberal rules of construction in mind, let
us turn then to a consideration of the meaning, purpose
and intent of the Rules relating to garnislunent as they
apply to the undisputed facts.
POINT 2. GARNISHEE'S LIABILITY TO THE DEFENDANT HEREIN IS A DEBT, CREDIT, CHOSE IN
ACTION, OR OTHER PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THE DEFEDANT HEREIN WITHIN THE MEANING OF RULE 64D.

This ease, of course. n1ust be decided under the applicable Utah Hules of ('1i\'il Procedure, which (so far as
4
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we have been able to ascertain) are unique, so that decisions from other jurisdictions are of little, if any, help.
Rule 64D (a) is the b.asic provision as to garnishment,
although, of course, it must be read and construed in connection with other provisions related to the same subject
matter. The material part.s are as follows:
" (a) When Plaintiff entitled to Writ; Affidavit.
The plaintiff, at any time .after the filing of the
complaint, may have a writ of garnishment issue,
and attach the credits, effects, debts, chases in
atcion, money, and other personal property of the
defendant in the possession or in the control of
any third person, as garnishee, whether the same
are due at the time of the service of the writ or
are to become due thereafter, under the same circumstances and by filing with the court in which
the action is pending an affidavit as required by
subdivision (a.) of Rule 640, relating to Attachments. ***" (Italics supplied.)

Where, as here, judgn1ent has been entered on plaintiffs' clai1n, Rule 64D(b) (2) dispenses with the affidavit,
and authorizes garnishn1ent in any action after judgment.
However, the reference to the Rule on attachments makes
it clear that the two rules are in pari materia and must
be construed together, as were the statutes from which
they were derived under the decision of this court in
Blue Creek Land & Livestock Co. v. Kehrer,
60 Utah 62, 206 Pac. 287, 288.
Rule 640 (a), on attachments, provides that
"The plaintiff, at any time after the filing
of the complaint, in an action on a judgment **1!:
or in an action to recover damages for any tort
committed *** against the person or property*""*
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may have the property of the defendant, not exempt from execution, attached as security for any
judgment that may be recovered*** by filing***
an affidavit *** that the defendant is indebted to
the plaintiff, specifying the amount thereof as
near as may be. ***" (Italics supplied.)
Note well the significance of this language: upon
the basis of a tort claim the plaintiff is directed to make
affidavit that the defendant is "indebted" to plaintiff.
}loreover, the "debt" is not necessarily liquidated, for
its basis can be a tort against the person, and the amount
thereof need only be specified '"as near as may be."
Obviously the fra1ners of this rule, in accord with
their intent that the rules shall be liberally construed,
are using words, and particularly the words "indebted"
and "debt" in the broadest possible sense, and intend tort
claims to be included in that meaning. This is in accord
with general usage, for Websters Collegiate Dictionary,
5th Edition, defines "debt" as "That which is due from
one person to another; thing owed; obligation; liability.''
And it is interesting to note, fron1 the discussion of
"debt" in Bout·ier's Laze Dictionary, Baldu·ins Edition,
1934, that the word may properly include ''All that is due
a man under any form of obligation or promise," and
that the old common law action of debt would lie to recover an~~ sum certain or (in the detinet) specific goods,
without regard to the manner in which the obligation wa~
incurred or is evidenced, as, e.g .. to recover a statutory
penalty for wilfully cutting tree~.
Clearly, then, a ''debt" due the defendant, as that
term is used by the framers of the Rules on attachment
and garnishment, includes and was intended to include

G
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any clain1 for the p.ayment of nwney or the delivery of
property, whether founded on contract, tort, statute
or otherwise, and whether liquidated or unliquidated.
A liberal construction of the broad language so broadly
used admits no other logical conclusion.

I~.:

)~t!'':

t, IJi ~
taeD!Ji

This conclusion gains added strength frorn a consideration of the provisions of Bule 64D(d), relating to
the interrogatories which the Rules require the garnishee
to answer under oath. The garnishee is required to state
whether he "is indebted to the defendant, either in property or money." (Italics supplied.) lie must also answer
whether he "has in his possession, in his charge, or ~tnder
his control any property, effects, goods, chattels, rights_,
credits or chases in action of the defendant *** and if so
the value of the same." (Italics supplied.) The use of the
phrase "indebted **""" in property" clearly and unequivocally indicates that the words "debt" and "indebted"
are not being used in their strict, narrow meaning, but
are being used in their most liberal, broad meaning, and
are intended to cover unliquidated tort oblig.ations as
well as liquidate{l contract obligations.
Still further strong support for this conclusion is
found in the provisions of Rule 64D (h), which provides
that the plaintiff may reply to the Garnishee's answers,
"and may also allege any matters which would
charge the garnishee with liability. Such new
matter in the reply shall be taken as denied or
avoided, and the matter thus at issue shall be tried
in the same manner as other issues of like nature.''
(Italics supplied.)
Note well the use of the word "liability," which denotes legal obligation in its broadest possible sense. RPP

7
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Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Baldwin's Edition, 1934, where
liability is defined as follows:

"Responsibility; the state of one who is bound
in law and justice to do something which may be
enforced by action; 36 Ia. 226; 57 Cal. 209; 36 N.
J. L. 145. This liability may arise from contracts
either express or implied, or in consequence of
torts cornmitted." (Italics supplied.)
It is not even necessary to apply a liberal construction to reach the conclusion that any liability, in tort or
contract, of the garnishee to the defendant may be reached by garnishment, as a "debt'•, and if liability be disputed, or the anwunt or extent thereof be unliquidated,
the "issue shall be tried in the same manner as other
issues."
The California Supreme Court in,
Dunsmoor v. Furstenfeldt, 26 Pac. 518, 520,
in discussing the word "debt" .as used in a garnishment
statute declares:
"Any kind of obligation of one man to pay
money to another is a debt. ·.l\. debt signifies what
one owes. There is always son1e obligation that
it shall be paid; but the n1anner in which it is
to be pairl. or the Jneans coercing payinent do not
enter into the definition.' •·
A "credit," as the term is used in Rule 64D(a) subjecting ~redits of the defendant to garnisillnent, is of
course the opposite or eorrelative eounterpart of a
"debt." A "debt" or ''debit" on the books of the defendant is a "credit" to the defendant on the books of
the garnishee. Thus every person "indebted .. to another
holds in hi~ possession, or under his eontrol a .. rrerlif'

8
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which may be attached by garnishment issued in an
action against the other, and which can be cancelled by
paying the ''debt" to the levying officer under the Rules.
Thu.s the liability of the garnishee here is a "credit" in
its hands which is subject to garnishment for the benefit of the plaintiffs.

-mr•,

It must next be noted that by Rule 64D(a) "chases
·in action··: of the defendant are subject to garnishment
without limitation or restriction. This is an innovation
insofar as garnishment before judgement i~ concerned.
Section 104-19-1, U.C.A., 1943, does not include chases
in action in the list of things subject to garnishment,
although Section 104-19-23, U.C.A., 1943, relating to garnishment after judgement specifically authorizes garnishment of a chose in action, and a chose in action has
always been subject to execution, in which case the sheriff is directed to serve the writ by either "collecting or
selling the choses in action and selling the other property." Rule 69(d) and Section 104-37-17, U.C.A., 1943.
The careful framers of the Rules must have intended
some positive result fron1 this innovation.

Bouvier's Law Dictionary says that a chose in action
lS

"A right to receive or recover .a debt, or
money, or damages for a breach of contract or
for a tort connected with a contract, but which
cannot be enforced without action."
And Black's Law Dictionary says also that
"A chose in action is any right to damages,
whether arising from the commission of a tort,
9
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the omission of a duty, or the breach of a contract."
It is so generally recognized that the phrase "chose
in action is substantially all inclusive that we hestitate to
belabor the point. However, we refer to a few of the
cases. The phrase includes demands arising out of tort
as well as contract:
Sharp v. Cincinnati (etc) Ry. Co. (Tenn.),
179 s. w. 375, 376;
Stirling v. Sims, 72 Ga. 51, 52;
Gillet v. Fairchild (N.Y.), 4 Denio 80, 82;
City of Cincinnati v. Hafer (Ohio St.), 30
N.E. 197, 198;
and includes a cause for personal injury,
Carver v. Ferguson (Cal. App.), 254 Pac.
2nd 44, 45;
and a cause for wrongful death,
In re Arduino's Est., 20 Ohio Dec. 461, 4 Ohio
N.P., N.S. 369;
and a cause of action against a constable for failure to
deliver replevied property,
People v. \Veaver (Ill. App.), -:1:0 X.E. :2nd
83, 8-:l:;
and a cause of action for fraud,
Conaway Y. Co-operative Home Builders
\\\rash.), 117 Pac. 716, 118.
Whatever may be the rule elsewhere, and whatever
the rule might have been in rtah prior to the adoption
of the Rules of Procedure, or (in garnislunent .after

10
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judgement) of Section 104-19-23, U.C.A., 1943, a chose
in action in tort as well as one in contract is now subject
to garnishment here. Thus, even if we were to concede
Appellant's premise that the chose garnished in the case
at bar sounds in tort, its conclusion that the chose is not
subject to garnishment is nevertheles.s unsound and
should be rejected by the Court.
However, the plaintiffs do not concede that premise.
It is true that it has been said that an action against a
liability insurer for mishandling the defense and compromise negotiations sound.s in tort, but it is submitted
that such statements are based on an insufficient and
inaccurate analysis of the facts and the law, and .are
erroneous. In fact and law the defendant's claim against
the garnishee, here attached by garnishment, is based,
and can be based only on a contract-the insurance
policy. If there were no contract, there could be no
duty on the insurer garnishee to defend or to, act on
offers of settlement with any degree of care whatsoever.
It would be utterly absurd to contend that an insur.anct~
company owes any duty to defend or settle a claim
against a stranger. The insurance contract is and must
be the source of all the insurer's duties and of all the
rights of the insured.
The duty to use "due care" and "good faith" in
responding to offers of settlement by the holder of a
claim against an insured arises and is implied from the
contract provisions requiring the insurer to defend and
giving it the exclusive right to compromise and settle.
The situation is analagous to those where a physician
is required, whenever retained, to use ordinary and
11
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reasonable care and diligence, and his best judgement,
in treating his patient (70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons, Sec. 41, p. 947); where an architect is bound to
bring to the performance of his contract reasonable
intelligence befitting his profession, and a proper investigation and knowledge of the business in hand, by his
contract implying that he has skill and ability in his field
and that he will exercise them reasonably and without
neglect ( 6 C.J.S. Architects, sec. 19, pp. 316-317); and
where a building contractor is impliedly obligated by
his contract to perform his work in a proper and workmanlike manner and with ordinary skill and care (9 C.J.
749-750). All of these duties, as well as the duties involved in the case at bar are implied contract duties,
not duties imposed by law on all and sundry, and hence
an action for the breach thereof sounds in contract and
not in tort.
Bouvier's Law Dictionary defines tort as "A private
or civil wrong or injun-. A zrrong independent of contract." (Italics supplied.) The sru.ne work comments:
"The word tort is used to describe that
branch of the law which treats of the redress of
injuries \vhich are neither crinws nor arise from
the breach of contracts.'' (Italics supplied.)
An in1plied contract provision of the insurance
poliry here is that in defending clain1s and acting on
offers received for the settle1nent thereof the insurance
cmnpan~· will act with due and ordinary care, and in
good faith, and (eonversely) will not .act unreasonably,
m.~g1igent1~·, or in bad faith. \Yhen the courts use the
t<'rtll "1w.!.digenr.e" in holding- an insurer liable under the

12
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circumstances they are not classifying the cause of
action as one in tort; they are 1nerely using an appropriate term to describe a breach of the contract to use
due care.
l~lt

!Uht~:

: use~
nrler~

This is made clear by the fact that some courts have
held that, in the absence of a policy provision authorizing
such action, the claiinant judgement creditor cannot sue
the insurer directly on its liability to the insured for an
excess judgement, because there is no privity of contract
between the insurer and the claimant.
Annotation : 40 ALR 2nd 195.
It may be noted in passing that the policy here involved has a specific provision that a claimant on a
covered claim may, after judgement is entered (as here)
sue the insurer directly on the policy.
The most recent and con1prehensive discussions of
the duty of the insurer to settle, and its liability for
failure to act with due care on offers of settlement are
found in an annotation in
40 ALR 2nd 168,170, et seq.,

and in
8 Appleman: Insurance Law and Practice,
Sections 4712-4713.
It should also be observed that

"Where plaintiff in an action for damages
has recovered judgement, he may garnish the
defendant's claim under a policy insuring hin1
against liability for dmnages of the kind recovered by plaintiff against him."
38 C.J.S. Garnishment, Sec. llOd., p. 318.
13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

There is no reason why this rule should not be
equally applicable to the appellant garnishee's liquidated contract liability to the defendant in the case at
bar. Where the liability is liquidated, as here, and
arises under contract, as here, it is quite immaterial
whether the obligation arises under the direct promise
to pay the liability, or under the promise to defend and
handle settlement offers with due care. Even under the
authorities relied on by Appellant the subject claim is
garnishable.
Finally, this claim may be garnished under Rule
64D (a) as "other personal property of the defendant."

Ag.ain it must be recalled that garnishment Rule is in
pari materia with the Attachment Rule, and that the
latter (Rule 64C (a)) provides only for attachment of
"the property of the defendant, not exempt from execution." Debts and choses in action are not specifically
mentioned, but the Rule on the "~fanner of executing
Writ" (Rule 640 (e) (6)) makes it clear that such claims
are intended to be included in the term "property," for
specific provision is made for the manner of attaching
"debts, credits and other personal property not capable
of manual delivery," and the Rule on Executions (Rule
69d) specifically provides for levy of execution on, and
the "collection or sale" of choses in action.
The conclusion is irresistable that the garnishee's
liability to the defendant in this ease is subjeet to garnishment as a "debt, credit, chose in action. or other
personal propertr of the defendant" within the meaning
of the Rule and of the statutes from which the Rule was
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derived, and there is no error in the order appealed
from.
POINT 3. GARNISHEEtS LIABILITY TO DEFENDANT
HEREIN IS IN GARNISHEE'S POSSESSION OR CONTROL
WITHIN THE MEANING OF RULE 64D.

Appellant, in its Point I, argues that defendant's
claim against the Appellant Garnishee is not subject
to garnishment because (so it is argued) it is not in
the "possession or control of a third person."
Here again we 1nust take issue with appellant both
on the premise and on the conclusion it advocates. Appellant assumes that the limiting phrase "in the possession or in the control of any third person" applies to
credits, debts and cho.ses in action as it does to tangible
personal property. We submit that this is not so.

•

Tangible personal property in defendant's possession or not in the possession, custody or control of anyone, is attached or levied upon by taking it physically
into the custody of the sheriff, as provided in Rule
64C(e) (3), whereas debts and credits and tangible
property in the possession or control of a third person
(as a bailee or pledgee) may be reached by garnishment of the person in control or possession. The two
procedures are complementary, and together afford a
remedy by which any kind of property can be reached
by a judgment creditor. To some extent the two procedures may even overlap, as where tangible property in
the hands of a third person may be either garnished or
levied on under attachment or execution, the plaintiff
being entitled to elect his remedy.

T\,

Rule'•

But under our Rules a debt (which is also a chose
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in action) can clearly be reached by garnishment, and
indeed, under the universal practice it is so reached,
without reference as to who has "the posses.sion or control." It is abundantly apparent that the framers of the
Rule intended the limitation as to possession or control
to be applicable only to tangible personal property,
and not to debts, credits, or choses in action, i.e., to intangible personal property.
The conclusion that the subject claim is not in the
possession or control of the garnishee here is equally
unsound. For all essential purposes under the garnishment rules a debtor, or the obligor of a chose in action
is in the control of the subject debt or damage obligation:
he can pay, or withhold payment to the creditor, or he
can pay or withhold payment to an assignee, or he can
pay or withhold pay1nent to the levying officer (at least
until judgmnent has been entered in the garnishment
proceeding). And even after assignment of the debt
or chose, he can, unless notified, discharge the obligation by paying the original creditor instead of his
successor.

By specific provision of the Garnislnnent Rule, the
Garnishee may deli \·er to the lev~i.ng officer the property
belonging to the defendant, together with the money due
the defendant and be relieyed frmu further liability in
tlw proceedings.
Rule <i4D(g).
If tlw garnishee answerf' that he has possession or
control of defendant's property or is indebted (liable)
to the defendant, the Court n1ust enter judge1nent for
t lw deliv<'r~· of the property to the f'heriff, to be sold
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under execution, and, as to 1noney obligations, must
"enter judgement in favor of the defendant for the use
of the plaintiff against the garnishee" for the amount
due.
Rule 64D(i).
And if the garnishee denies liability to the defendant, and the denial is traversed, or facts alleged charging
the garnishee with liability, that "issue shall be tried
in the san1e manner as other issues of like nature.
Judgement shall be rendered on the verdict or finding
the same as if the garnishee had answered according to
such verdict or finding." (Italics supplied.)
Rule 64D(h).
And that judgement "shall acquit him (the garnishee) from all demands by the defendant for all goods,
effects or credits paid, delivered or accounted for by the
garnishee by force" thereof, just as under the attachment
rule "Pa-yment of such debts, or delivery or transfer of
such property or debts, to the officer shall be a sufficient discharge of the same as to the defendant."
Rules 64D(k), and 64C(m).
What more control is necessary than the garnishee's
authority and power to acquit himself of all obligations
to the defendant by paying his obligation to the officer
or into court in obedience to the process and judgements
of the court? \V e confess we cannot imagine. All parties
are protected, and justice is done speedily and economically, and in full accord with established and recognized
procedures.
The case of M ortmer vs. Young, L27 Pac. 2nd 950,
relied on by Appellant is not in point in this issue. It
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holds n1erely that a chose in action for fraud is sufficiently in the control of the owner thereof that notice
to him will support an execution sale of the chose upon
which the purchaser might later bring action against the
tort feasor. It is not a case such as the one at bar in
which the judgement creditor seeks to collect the chose
in action by judicial process. And it held the chose sub.iect to levy by execution.
Neither is A.ppellant's case of Bassett v. McCarty,
101 P. 2nd 575, where the Washington Court, manifestly

strongly influenced by what it felt would be unwarranted
hardship on the garnishee, under the Washington Statute, held generally that "unliquidated" tort claims are
not subject to garnishment, and that the rendering of
a verdict does not change this rule while the action is
still pending in court before entry of judgement, as the
claim is not under the control of the garnishee. The
latter ruling can perhaps be justified on the ground that
once action is filed on the claim, the matter is in the control of the court, which, for orderly procedure, must
control the parties appearing and consent to any substitution. An action was alre.ady pending on the claim,
and a second garnishee action manifestly should abate.
The effective result 1night well have been different if
the plaintiff had levied on the clailn and then filed a
petition to intervene or to be substituted as a plaintiff
in the .action pending. No prior aetion was pending when
garnishment was served herein. It must be re1nen1bered
also that the clailn in the case at bar has been liquidated
from its inception.
l\ioreover, California
clusion. See

ha~

reached the contrary con-
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~:

Department of Water and Power of the City
of Los Angeles v. Inyo Chemical Co., 108
Pac. 2nd 410.
See also
Sniderman v. Nerone (Pa.), 9 Atl. 2nd 335,
and
Barr v. Warner (Ore.), 62 Pac. 99.
POINT 4. THE AUTHORITIES RELIED ON BY APPELLANT ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE ARISING UNDER THE PEoCULIAR UTAH RULES.

Each case is, of course, limited by the facts involved,
the statutes controlling and the rule of construction applicable.
Few of the cases cited by appellant appear to come
frorn jurisdictions where, .as here, a liberal rule of construction must be followed. Certainly the decisions cited
apply a very strict rule of construction to the garnishment statutes considered.
And, as we have before indicated, none of the jurisdictions relied on by appellant have statutes which even
approach our Rules in their broad and comprehensive
scope and terminology, which conforms so well to the
basic philosophy behind the Rules that every right shall
be supported by a direct, speedy, simple and inexpensive
remedy. Accordingly decisions from other jurisdictions
restricting and lin1iting garnishrnent therein can have
little if any application under the Utah Rules.
Other decisions relied on by Appellant are distinguishable on their facts. In an effort to assist the
court we will consider son1e of these very briefly.
The case of Brenau College v. Mincey, 61 S.E. 2nd
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301, cited on Page 7 of Appellant's Brief, involved a tort
claim for loss of the services of claimant's wife-a claim
which was purely personal to the claimant and which
he could not assign, even voluntarily. It was unliquidated. The claim here is liquidated and it is assignable,
as we shall see. The fact that such a claim is not assignable is of the utmost significance, as appears from Lewis
v. Barnett (Kan.), 33 Pac. 2nd 331, 93 A.L.R. 1082, cited
on page 7 of Appellant's Brief. There .attempt was made
to garnish an unliquidated chose in action for personal
injuries, which is universally held to be incapable of
assignment, as is an injury to reputation. See
6 C.J .S. Assignments, Sec. 33, p. 1081.
The Kansas Court declared, "Garnishment is in effect
a formal judicial assignment of such actual property,
money and credits that would be capable of being voluntarily assigned.'' It held that as the claimant could not
have transferred it voluntarily, it could not be transferred involuntarily by garnishment.
Similarly the cases of Coty v. Cogswell, 50 Pac.
2nd 249; Pacific Gas and Elect1·ic Co. v. Nakano, 87 Pac.
2nd 700, 121 A.L.R. 417; and 1Jlcvleilty v. Furman, 95 Atl.
2nd 267, 35 A.L.R. 2nd 1436, cited on page 7 of Appellant's Brief, all involve unliquidated and 110n-assignnble
claims based on personal injury.
The case of Black v. Plumb, 29 Pac. 2nd 708, 91
A.L.R. 1334, cited on page 5 of Appellant's Brief, also
involves an unliq'ttidated elaiin. \Vhile it is true that the
clain1 there was assignable (a claim for conversion of
property), the Colorado Court there does not consider
that rnattPr, nor does it ronsider the possible application
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of the phrase "chose in action" in the Colorado Statute,
but blindly, and (we believe) erroneously followed Donald Co. v. Dubinsky, 219 Pac. 209, in which it was properly held that garnishn1ent was not available in aid of
an action for deceit, a tort clailn, where under the Colorado Code of Civil Procedure, Section 97, garnishment
is available only in aid of an action on a contract. Certainly, from the fact that garnishment will not issue
except in a contract action it does not follow that tort
claims are not subject to attachment by garnishment
where the writ has been properly issued. If this were
true, we would claim this case as authority to support
the position of plaintiffs herein, for here we have the
converse: a rule authorizing garnishment in aid of unliquidated non-assignable tort claims, so that, by the
s.ame reasoning, unliquidated, non-assignable, tort claims
should be garnishable.
We have already 1nentioned briefly the ca.ses of
Mortimer vs. Young, 127 Pac. 2d 950, and Bassett v.
McCarty, 101 Pac. 2d 575 (page 8 of Appellant's Brief).
The first held that a chose in action for fraud is subject
to levy and sale under execution, and hence supports
plaintiffs' position here, and the second involved an unassignable tort claim for slander. Interestingly enough
the same court has held that a cause of action for alienation of affections is a "debt" in .aid of which garnishment may issue under the Washington Statute!
As we have said, it is admitted that the claim involved in the case at bar is, and since its inception it
has been liquidated. As it arises either on contract or
(according to Appellant's view) on tort for injury to the
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defendant'.s property or estate (as distinguished from
his person or reputation) it is assignable:
6 C.J.S. Assignments, sections 31 and 34, pp.
1080 and 1082.

Even an unliquidated clailn on an insurance policy
rnay be subject to garnish1nent. See,
Brainard vs. Rogers, 239 Pac. 1095, and
Security Building and Loan Association vs.
Ward (Okla.), 50 Pac. 2nd, 651.
It is submitted that the proper rule in Utah is that
any chose in action, in contract, in tort, or statute, or
otherwise, and whether liquidated or unliquidated, is
subject to garnishment if it is assignable. However,
inasmuch as the clain1 here is liquidated, it is unnecessary to decide in this case whether an unliquidated
claim is within the rule.
It may well be that the legislature, by the adoption
of the statute last appearing as section 104-19-23, U.C.A.,
1943, intended to make otherwise non-assignable choses
in action subject to garnishment under the liberal construction there specifically required. If so, this would
make a change in the substantive comn1on law on assignability of claims which the Court could not properly
change by a rule of procedure. But here again it is unnecessary to decide the point, .as our claim is assignable.
CONCLUSION

It is respertfully subrnitted that the elain1 of the
defendant Kirkendall against the appellant garnishee is
a liquidatr-d, a~signahle debt, rredit, or ehose in action,
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or is otherwise property of the defendant in the garnishee's control, and as such it is subject to the garnishment issued on plaintiffs' judgen1ent and served on the
Garnishee.
Common justice requires that if the defendant has
a valid claiin it be made subject to the payment of plaintiffs' modest judgement which is one of the factors on
which the claim is based. Defendant has nothing else
on which to levy. The liber.al construction for which the
Rules themselves provide equally requires this result.
It is respectfully submitted that there is no error
in the interlocutory order appealed from, and it should
be affirmed and the garnishment procleeding remanded
for trial under the provisions of Rule 64D (h).

Respectfully submitted,
YOUNG, THATCHER &
GLAS1'IANN
1018 First Security Bank
Building
Ogden, Utah
and
MILO V. OLSON
518 Pacific Mutual Building
Los Angeles 14, California
Attorneys for Respondents
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